Imaging the Mind? Taking Stock a Decade After the "Decade of the Brain"

Imaging the Mind?

Taking Stock a Decade After the "Decade of the Brain"

April 1-3 2011 in Amsterdam

funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW)

 

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Program

Friday, April 1; Shaffyzaal, Felix Meritis, Keizersgracht 324

15:00 Arrivals with coffee and tea
15:30 Welcome Address (Trudy Dehue, Groningen) and Introduction (Stephan Schleim, Groningen)

Block 1: Lectures (each 45 min talk + short discussion)

To what extent are empirical and conceptual insights concerning cognition and behavior dependent upon each other and capable of informing each other? Is it possible to distinguish an apriori (conceptual) and an empirical component in neuroscience research and if so, what should their interaction amount to?

16:00 Peter Hagoort (Nijmegen): Cognitive neuroscience beyond philosophy

Abstract: There is a school of philosophers who believe that the garden of nature should be cleaned first from the conceptual weeds by qualified philosophers, before empirical researchers should be allowed to enter the scene. I will defend a different position. This is one in which, for the case of cognitive neuroscience, knowledge on brain and cognition is strongly driven by new research tools and methods, which provide new challenges for conceptual analysis.

17:00 Peter Hacker (Oxford): What philosophy can contribute to cognitive neuroscience

Abstract: Conceptual problems are the proper province of philosophy. They cannot be resolved by empirical investigations, for they are problems about the means of representation, not about what is represented. Cognitive neuroscience operates across the boundaries between neurophysiology and psychology, the concepts of which are categorially dissimilar. Unsurprisingly the history of the subject displays a multitude of conceptual difficulties, which continue to this day. Analytic philosophy can contribute to the resolution and clarification of a wide range of conceptual problems in contemporary neuroscience. This can be readily exemplifed in the case of neuroscientific investigations of perception.

18:00 Coffee break

Block 2: Lecture (as before) and General Discussion (max. 60 min)

Given the interest of psychology in person-level investigations, it appears to remain closer to the apriori conceptual analysis defended by Hacker than neuroscience does. However, has neuroscience inspired psychologists to refer to lower levels of explanation, taking more distance from the person-level? And has this resulted in a re-consideration of the distinction between empirical and conceptual analysis for psychologists?

18:30 Bernhard Hommel (Leiden): Psychology between methodological pluralism and theoretical reductionism. Cognitive neuroscience as challenge and opportunity

Abstract: The enormous success of the cognitive neurosciences poses a number of potentially threatening challenges for psychology as a discipline. I will discuss several of these challenges, such as the trend away from a mechanistic, functional understanding of human cognition and towards theoretical reductionism or the potential of expensive neuroscientific research to exhaust the few financial resources that remain for funding behavioral research. However, I will also emphasizes the importance of meeting these challenges – not the least because psychology is arguably the most essential link between the natural sciences and the humanities. A successful survival strategy for psychology should emphasize this bridging potential, which among other things requires that psychologists become more familiar with neuroscientific methodology, including their strengths and limitations, and that they engage more in interdisciplinary research and volatile, temporary research networks.

19:30 Discussion with the speakers and the audience, moderated by Douwe Draaisma (Groningen)

20:30 Reception with snacks and drinks (until approximately 22:00 o’clock)

Saturday, April 2; Doelenzaal, University Library, University of Amsterdam

Background: According to the tri-level distinction proposed by David Marr, cognitive neuroscience research distinguishes between the computational task/competence level, the algorithmic level, and the neural implementation level. During this conference, presentations will consider what neuroimaging research tells us about phenomena at these levels and their (cor)relations. In particular, they will consider to what extent the balance or interaction between levels has been changed with the development of brain imaging techniques.

09:15 Introduction into the second day (Machiel Keestra, Amsterdam)

Session 1: Foundational issues in neuroimaging (each 30 min plus discussion)

From the shared Nobel Prize for Ramón y Cajal and Golgi in 1906 onwards, serious disagreements about neuroanatomy and functional properties of neurons and their implications characterize neuroscience. With the increase of neuroimaging experiments, precise anatomical localization of functional activation has become more important than ever. What are the contemporary disputes on the functioning and the structure of the brain? Given the increasingly complexity of neuroimaging results, are these capable of settling these disputes?

09:30 Katrin Amunts (Aachen): Brain anatomy – Landmarks and challenges in the identification of brain areas*
10:15 Michael Anderson (Lancaster, PA): How to drink from a firehose: What we have learned, and how we can keep learning from neuroimaging data

Abstract: A decade after the decade of the brain, we have by now performed tens of thousands of functional neuroimaging studies. Although each published study may have made some specific contribution to our understanding of brain function, it is time to take stock of what this data can tell us in aggregate. This talk will detail a few of the (perhaps surprising) patterns that appear when looking at the data as a whole, and discuss some of the promises and pitfalls of emerging methods in brain imaging analysis and meta-analysis.

11:00 Coffee break

Session 2: Contributions of neuroimaging to psychology

What has neuroimaging so far contributed to understanding our mind, a project traditionally carried out by philosophy of mind and psychology? Is the relationship between cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy of mind one of co-development, to what extend are they independent of each other, or will cognitive neuroscience even replace other mind-disciplines as has been claimed by some?

11:30 Adina Roskies (Dartmouth): The assumptions of imaging the mind and their impact on psychology and philosophy of mind*
12:15 (invited psychologist-neuroscientist)

13:00 Lunch break

Session 3: States of phenomenal experience in neuroimaging – measuring the immeasurable?

It can be argued that the psychological level of explanation is irreplaceable, so can it be argued that phenomenology is still relevant for both experimental design and the development of relevant research questions. Moreover, it can be argued that neuroscientific insights will be judged for their phenomenological plausibility or ecological validity, which is difficult to realize in neuroimaging experiments. This renders phenomenology a status of being complementary to neuroscientific insights  The speakers discuss this with regard to normal (Bayne) and abnormal (Aleman) states of phenomenal experience. In addition, they will discuss whether neuroscience helps in drawing a line between those two classes, or not?

14:30 Timothy Bayne (Oxford): Imaging and the Study of Consciousness
15:15 Andre Aleman (Groningen): Self-reflection, hallucination and identity in the brain scanner*

16:00 Coffee break

Session 4 and final discussion: Beyond the individual mind – society and culture in neuroimaging

It has been pointed out that most neuroscientific (and psychological, in general) investigations are for the most part carried out on Western psychology students and are thus not generalizable to the global population. What do we know about transcultural differences and what does that imply for our neuroimaging endeavours, in research design as well as interpretation?

16:30 (invited social psychologist-neuroscientist)
17:15 Final discussion: Imaging the Mind? Taking stock at the end of the conference (max. 60 minutes)

Sunday, April 3; Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam

Two times two workshops of two hours will be held at 9:30 and 13:00 o’clock to inform interdisciplinary scholars about pertinent issues in neuroscience. Topics will be principles of brain functioning (held by Michael Anderson), ethical implications of neuroscience research and technology (held by Adina Roskies), basics of neuroscience methods, and neuroscience and culture. More details will be published shortly.

* preliminary title

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Participation

Reservation in advance is required and the number of participants is limited. Participation costs are € 40 for Friday and € 70 for Saturday or € 100 for both days together. Coffee, tea and pastry during the breaks are included. Snacks on Friday evening are included but drinks have to be paid at the bar. Bachelor and master students receive a 25% discount on the conference participation fee. The workshops are € 30 each and the number of participants is strictly limited to a maximum of 20 to guarantee a high quality.

Reservation

To participate in the conference, please write to Felix Schirmann, , indicating the days you want to participate in as well as your academic affiliation. You will receive details concerning payment shortly. Reservations will become effective upon reception of payment.

Organization

Organization team: Stephan Schleim,  (Groningen) in cooperation with Machiel Keestra,  (Amsterdam)
Assistance: Felix Schirmann (Groningen) and Renée Veldhuis (Amsterdam)

Please contact the organization team if you have questions concerning the program.

Institutions: University of Groningen, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Theory and History of Psychology in cooperation with University of Amsterdam, Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies and Cognitive Science Center